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Heisenberg ... hatte seine nichtlineare Spinorfeldtheorie auf die Voraussetzung der all-
gemeinen ... Quantentheorie und die Forderung der Poincare´-Gruppe und der Isosp-
ingruppe gegru¨ndet. Als ich ihn fragte, warum genau diese Gruppen, sagte er etwa:
‘Das kann ich nicht mehr begru¨nden. Mit einer Forderung muß man eben anfangen.’
Ich fragte: ‘Warum u¨berhaupt Gruppen?’ Er, etwa: ‘Wenn man mit einer Forderung
anfa¨ngt, dann ist Symmetrie der beste Anfang. Symmetrie ist scho¨n, das wußte schon
Platon. Darin dru¨ckt sich die zentrale Ordnung aus.’ ...
Ich aber blieb unbefriedigt. Mir schien, man solle eine rationale Behauptung wie die
Geltung einer Symmetrie womo¨glich noch rational begru¨nden. Meine Vermutung war:
Symmetrie bedeutet die Trennbarkeit des jeweils untersuchten Gegenstandes vom Rest
der Welt. ... Die Frage ist, ob man diesem Gedanken noch eine strengere Fassung
geben kann.
C. F. von Weizsa¨cker (1992, p. 910)
1 The Origin: The Philosophy of Physics
Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker’s thinking has always crossed the borders between physics and
philosophy. Being a physicist by training he still feels at home in the physics community, as a
philosopher by passion, however, his mind cannot stop thinking at the limits of physics. His
physical ideas are based on the general conceptual and methodological preconditions of physical
theories. The above quotation does indicate this: Heisenberg’s hint on symmetry as a natural
starting point for a physicist—even though already philosophically motivated by Plato—left
Weizsa¨cker “dissatisfied.” He even wanted to explore the reasons for the symmetries themselves.
Such a line of reasoning about the foundations of physics has brought Weizsa¨cker into an
abstract program of a possible reconstruction of physics in terms of yes-no-alternatives, which
he called “ur-theory.” I shall start this paper with a review of the basic ideas of ur-theory: the
definition of an ur and the connection between ur-spinors and spacetime (Sect. 2: “Yesterday”).
I then go over to some of ur-theory’s present borders: the construction of quantized spacetime
tetrads and the difficulties to incorporate gravity and gauge theories (Sect. 3: “Today”). It
goes without saying that my brief review will be far from being complete—see in particular the
developments presented in Castell et al. (1975-1986). In the last section (Sect. 4: “Tomorrow”)
I shall discuss the possible prospects of ur-theory—partly with a view to modern quantum
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gravity approaches, but mainly in connection with its philosophical implications. Here, one of
the crucial questions is, whether form, or, modern, information is an entity per se and what
particular consequences this may have.
2 Yesterday: Urs, Spinors and Spacetime
Weizsa¨cker’s first book on the philosophy of physics, Zum Weltbild der Physik, appeared in 1943
in its first edition—when his professional main concern still was ‘real physics.’ But already at this
time his ‘real interest’ had shifted to the foundations of quantum mechanics. About ten years
later, at a spa in Bad Wildungen in 1954, Weizsa¨cker had the crucial idea: the quantum theory
of a binary alternative is the theory of objects in a three-dimensional space. Mathematically,
he had just stumbled about the fact that SU(2), the quantum theoretical symmetry group of
a binary alternative, is locally isomorphic to the three-dimensional rotation group SO(3) in
Euclidean space. Philosophically, however, this was more “satisfying” than just to start with
a certain symmetry, since now the symmetry itself was distinguished by the fact that it is the
symmetry of the simplest logical object—a yes-no-alternative. Couldn’t this be a reason for the
three-dimensionality of position space?
Weizsa¨cker’s approach rests on two main ‘ingredients’: firstly, the idea of reducing physics
to binary alternatives and, secondly, the connection between spin structures and the struc-
tures of time and space. This second motive has caused David Finkelstein (1994) to subsume
Weizsa¨cker’s approach under the heading of “spinorism” and this will be my main concern in
this and the following section. For a moment, however, we shall consider the first mentioned,
rather philosophical ingredient. Here the idea is that—in its core—physics reduces to predicting
measurement outcomes. Measurement outcomes may be restated in terms of empirically decid-
able n-fold alternatives, and, trivially, any n-fold alternative can be embedded into a (Cartesian)
product of binary alternatives. Binary alternatives, in turn, can be considered as bits of infor-
mation. Thus physics reduces to information or, more precisely, potential information.
Weizsa¨cker has called the empirically decidable binary alternatives in his reconstruction ur-
alternatives (from the German prefix ‘Ur-’: ‘original,’ ‘elementary,’ ‘pre-’). A bit whimsically, he
later called them urs. Urs may be considered the fundamental objects in physics. As a matter
of principle, any physical object can be built out of them. The reader may note that at this
point an interesting conceptual shift has occurred. We started from the notion of information,
a subjective notion in the first place, and applied it to the objective notion of a physical object.
This is another way of saying that objects are reduced or even ‘made out of’ information. It
seems that via this shift information has been gained the status of a substance. In the last
section I shall indeed come back to this challenging formula, as our present working hypothesis,
however, we will take an information-theoretic reductionist view of physics in the sense that
physical objects are entirely characterized by the information which can be gained from them.
In quantum theory in particular, this view has a lot of plausibility. Quantum objects are
represented in terms of their Hilbert state spaces, their quantum states correspond to empirically
decidable alternatives. Any quantum object may further be de-composed or embedded into
the tensor product of two-dimensional objects, nowadays called quantum bits or qubits. Urs,
therefore, are in fact nothing but qubits (cf. Sect. 4).
Weizsa¨cker’s vision of the structure of physics as a quantum theory of ur-alternatives has its
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roots in the above mentioned fact that the essential symmetry group of urs, which is SU(2), is
the double covering of the rotational symmetry group of three-dimensional position space. The
guiding line is that, if the idea of urs as fundamental entities is true, the symmetry of such urs
should play an essential role in the reconstruction of physics and in the phenomenology of our
empirical world. And, of course, position space is probably the most essential feature of the
empirical world!
But this only gives rise to spinorism in general, the mathematical motive of deriving the
spacetime structure from a primarily given spin structure.1 A more precise ur-theoretic ansatz
was chosen in Weizsa¨cker’s 1958 papers Die Quantentheorie der einfachen Alternative (Kom-
plementarita¨t und Logik II)—internally called “KL II”—and the “Dreima¨nnerarbeit” KL III
together with Erhard Scheibe and Georg Su¨ßmann. KL II starts from the well-known and deep
connection between tensors and spinors: there always exists a mapping between tensors of order
n and spinors of order 2n. A lightlike four-vector, in particular, can be written in terms of the
Pauli matrices σµ as
kµ = σ
µ
A˙B
uA˙uB , (1)
where uA is a spinor and dotted indices denote complex conjugate components. This relation
highlights the link between the homogeneous Lorentz group SO(1, 3) and SL(2,C), the uni-
modular group in spinor space (the spinors do not obey a unitary norm here). But instead
of elaborating the thus defined spin structure of Minkowski space, the focus of KL III lies on
Weizsa¨cker’s idea of “multiple quantization.” Generally speaking, the procedure of quantization
can be split into two steps: (i) the transition from a (classically) discrete number of degrees of
freedom to infinitely many degrees, and (ii) the transition to operator-valuedness and, hence,
appropriate commutation relations. Starting from a simple, classical yes-no-alternative aA, step
(i) means the construction of a wavefunction φ(aA), i.e. a spinor uA ≡ φ(aA). Relation (1) allows
to transform uA ⇔ kµ, then (ii) implies the transition kµ → kˆµ. This is the ‘first quantization’
of a binary alternative. On the level of ‘second quantization’ wavefunctions ϕ(kµ) occur, where
operators kˆµ act upon. Interpreting kµ as energy-momentum four-vector, we get quantum me-
chanical wavefunctions ψ(xµ) in Minkowski space after Fourier transformation. The next, third
level of quantizing ψ(xµ) corresponds to usual quantum field theory.
Weizsa¨cker, Scheibe and Su¨ßmann discovered in their paper the Weyl and—after doubling
the state space of urs and working with bi-spinors—the Dirac and Klein-Gordon equation and
also the homogeneous Maxwell equations as algebraic identities!2 Since for a nullvector one
obtains kµk
µ = 0, the massless Klein-Gordon equation follows for instance from
kˆµkˆ
µ ϕ(kµ) = 0
FT
⇐⇒ ψ(xµ) = 0. (2)
1To the best of my knowledge, Weizsa¨cker presented the first hint on spinorism in a short note from 1951 on
the occasion of Werner Heisenberg’s 50th birthday, where he drew attention to the fact that both position space
and Hilbert space are provided with a quadratic metric and that in order to give a deeper reason for this one
presumably needs a property common to both spaces (which indeed could be the spin structure). He closes that
perhaps the question of the structure of the state space is fundamental, whereas the structure of position space is
a dependent and derived one—a rather bold and visionary remark in 1951 (and, of course, still today)! If we now
take the publication date of this note (Weizsa¨cker 1952), then this Festschrift can simultaneously be considered
as celebrating 50 years of Weizsa¨cker’s idea of spinorism. However, the rather mathematical hint from 1951/52,
the second ingredient of ur-theory, was only filled with conceptual life two years later at the above mentioned
spa. This little episode also sheds light on the crucial interplay between philosophy and physics in Weizsa¨cker’s
thinking.
2Details of the derivation must be left out due to lack of space, the reader may consult KL III or Lyre (1998a,
chap. 2.4).
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Let D(1
2
, 0) be the fundamental representation of SL(2,C) and D(0, 1
2
) its complex-conjugate,
then the transition to bi-spinors effectively means to work with D(1
2
, 0) ⊗D(0, 1
2
). I shall show
in the next section how this combines with a proper usage of the full spin structure of urs.
We have so far presented ur-theoretic arguments to introduce Minkowski spacetime as a local
spacetime model, we shall now go over to global spacetime considerations. We start again with a
quantum theory of binary alternatives, but this time with usual quantum bits obeying a unitary
norm. The symmetry group of urs then contains SU(2), U(1) and the complex conjugation. As
a Lie group manifold, this yields
SU(2)× U(1) = S3 × S1. (3)
Weizsa¨cker (1985) has made the far-reaching assumption—for which the above portrayed
spinorism is just the motive—that S3 itself should be considered a model of global cosmic space.
It follows that urs are wavefunctions on S3. As Thomas Go¨rnitz (1988) has shown, this leads to
a remarkably fresh look at the large numbers in physics on the basis of the multiplicity of the
regular representations of SU(2), in accordance with the Planck scale and Weizsa¨cker’s earlier
calculations. This will be explained in a moment. Moreover, for the appropriate treatment of
global cosmic time and time in general, the distinction between past and future plays a ma-
jor role in Weizsa¨cker’s philosophy of physics. He considers it a very precondition of empirical
science, on which the concept of separable alternatives has to be built. In my opinion it is
therefore highly implausible to take U(1) as a model of cosmic time, which would be cyclic then.
Obviously, time demands a special treatment (see, however, Castell 1975 for an opposite view).
We now seek to calculate the number of urs, starting from Weizsa¨cker’s early estimations
in the 60’s. As a wavefunction on global space, one ur can be thought of as the alternative
of being in the ‘one half’ or the ‘other half’ of the universe. Suppose now we want to localize
a nucleon in the universe. The Compton wavelength can be understood as a natural measure
of localizing a certain particle. For a nucleon, the ratio between the cosmic radius R and the
Compton wavelength λ is about 1040. We therefore have to decide 1040 alternatives in each
spatial direction to localize that nucleon. Hence, in ur-theory the assumption is made that a
nucleon is 1040 urs (up to two or three orders of magnitude). Accordingly, an electron is about
1037 urs.
The Compton wavelength λ of a nucleon is actually a distinguished measure of length. If we
take the whole energy content of the universe to subdivide space into equal intervals, then λ drops
out. In this sense it is indeed an elementary length. We may of course measure up smaller regions
of space, but then, as a matter of principle, do we loose the possibility to perform measurements
of other regions at the same time with the same accuracy. In this sense the number of elementary
spatial cells, which is N =
(
R
λ
)3
= 10120, is the total number of elementary “events” in the world
and, thus, the total number of urs (the one bit decision whether, for instance, a particular cell
is occupied by a nucleon). Accordingly, the dimension of the Hilbert space of urs is 210
120
. As a
result, not as an input, Weizsa¨cker got the number of nucleons as 10
120
1040
= 1080—in accordance
with empirical results!
As already mentioned, Go¨rnitz has refined these estimations and put them on a more solid,
group-theoretical basis. He considered the regular representation of SU(2), i.e. the represen-
tation in terms of square-integrable functions of the Hilbert space L2(S3) on SU(2) itself as a
homogeneous space S3. The multiplicity of the irreducible representations of the reduced tensor
product of spin-1
2
-representations of SU(2) shows a characteristic cut-off at functions with a
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wavelength of the order lo =
R√
N
, where R is the radius of S3 and N the number of ur-functions
(cf. Go¨rnitz 1988 for details). Obviously, lo is now the lower bound of spatial distances which can
be measured in a cosmos with N urs at maximum. lo is indeed a fundamental elementary length
in the sense that it represents the smallest spatial resolution physically possible. Remarkably,
from the above N = 10120 we get lo = 10
−60R, i.e. the Planck length! Conversely, if we already
know about the Planck scale from other considerations (as we usually do), we get N = 10120 as
a result—in accordance with Weizsa¨cker’s original, more hand-waving estimations.
3 Today: Tetrads, Gravity and Gauges
In the preceding section we have discussed the possibility of introducing spacetime from an ur-
hypothesis and also deriving the form of the basic equations for matter fields (mainly the Dirac
equation) and the simplest free interaction field (the homogeneous Maxwell equations). From
a broader perspective two questions arise: Shouldn’t the ur-theoretic ansatz, a way of deriving
spacetime itself, directly lead to gravity (or, perhaps, even quantum gravity)? Shouldn’t we
be able to derive interaction gauge theories in general? Ambitious questions, indeed, but it is
perhaps not astonishing that in abstract accounts like ur-theory questions like these arise at
the very beginning. And despite of their ambitious character and also far from really answering
them I try to discuss in the following some possible ways to tackle these questions.
As a working hypothesis, let us, again, take SU(2) = S3 as a model of global position
space. Urs can be understood as non-local functions on SU(2) and do naturally represent a
spinor dyad (with spinors uA, vA satisfying uAv
A = −vAu
A = 1). It is now well-known that a
spinor dyad is equivalent to a null-vector vierbein or tetrad, where the four null-vectors have the
form (1), but consist of mixed combinations of uA and vA (the details of this and the following
paragraph can be found in Lyre 1998b). By considering suitable linear combinations of the
null-vectors, such a null-tetrad can generally be written in real-valued form θαµ = (tµ, xµ, yµ, zµ),
where the space-like vectors xµ, yµ, zµ represent a spatial dreibein tangent to S3 together with
an orthogonal time-like vector tµ. The interesting point is that, since the tetrad is written in
terms of ur-spinor components, a (first) quantization of urs also induces a quantization of the
tetrad. Such a quantized ur-tetrad, however, means nothing but quantized coordinates in our
spacetime model.
As a remarkable of the quantized ur-tetrad it turns out that the time operator tˆµ in is just
the ur-number operator nˆ = 1
2
∑
r{aˆ
+
r , aˆr} in the Fock space of Bose urs. This is consistent with
Weizsa¨cker’s assumption that the growth of the total number of urs is a measure of temporal
cosmic evolution. Now, since the number operator has indeed a lower bound at zero, the global
spacetime model S3 × R+ with a time parameter manifold R+ seems justified (thus avoiding
globally closed time-like curves as mentioned in Sect. 2).
Can all this give us a hint how to describe (quantum) gravity in ur-theory? We may think of
θαµ as representing four vector bosons, i.e. massless ‘gravitons’ with spin 1 and get a corresponding
wave equation  θαµ(x) = 0 analogous to (2). This could perhaps describe the gravitational field
in non-standard form (i.e. not as a spin-2 field) in the linearized limit. However, what we are
really looking for is a recipe to make this field dynamical and couple it to matter. This was
actually a main disadvantage of KL III. The theory of the free Maxwell field followed from
the fact that D(1
2
, 0) ⊗ D(1
2
, 0) = D(1
2
, 1
2
) ⊕ D(0, 0) consists of a spin-1 triplett and a spin-
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0 singulett, where the former can be written in terms of an anti-symmetric tensor with the
algebraic properties of Maxwell’s field strength tensor. Even if we grant this as a ‘derivation’ of
Maxwell’s free theory, and even if we have also obtained Dirac’s equation as a free matter field
theory, the dynamical coupling of both fields is still missing.
Today, the usual recipe of coupling matter and interaction fields is the gauge principle. The
idea is to start from a global symmetry of the free matter field theory and then to postulate
the corresponding local symmetry as well. The geometrical picture is that of a fiber bundle
over spacetime, where the fibers are represented by the local symmetry group. It thus turns
out that the inhomogeneous term in the covariant derivative (i.e. covariant under local gauge
symmetry transformations) has the interpretation of a bundle connection. A word of caution,
however: most textbooks present the connection coupling term as a genuine way to introduce
a real physical field. But this is certainly an overestimation of a mere symmetry requirement!
The appearence of a connection only adjustes the postulate of local gauge symmetry, the con-
nection itself must still be considered flat, i.e. with vanishing bundle curvature. A true physical
interaction field requires non-vanishing curvature and hence non-flat connections, but these are
clearly not enforced by the logic of the gauge principle. Local gauge transformations must be
understood as a mere change in the position representation of the wavefunction and are thus
physically vacuous. The situation is analogous to choosing curvilinear coordinates in flat space
(which leads to Christoffel symbols, i.e. connections, but no gravitational field, i.e. non-vanishing
curvature). Therefore, one needs a true physical input to generally justify the connection term
as non-flat. In general relativity this input is the equivalence principle. It has been argued
that one possible way to establish the connection term as a real coupling term could be a gen-
eralization of the equivalence principle by introducing generalized ‘inertial’ and ‘field charges’
(Lyre 2000). Whatever this physical input may be, in the following I will understand the gauge
principle already in such a stronger, truly physical sense.
Now, a gauge theory is characterized by a certain gauge group. One nice starting point for
an ur-theoretic gauge theory of gravity could be the fact that the quantized ur-tetrad generates
a group which itself could be used as a proper gauge group. It can be shown that the Lie algebra
of the ur-tetrad operators is 12-dimensional and that the corresponding Lie group is isomorphic
to SL(2,C)× SL(2,C). Whether and how this group can be used for a proper gauge approach
is still an open question. One interesting point to be mentioned is that the operators of this
algebra “live” in flat Minkowski spacetime (in ur-theory this is reflected by unimodular groups
rather than unitary ones). As in many other gauge approaches of gravity we would therefore
describe the gravitational field in a flat space—and perhaps in this sense it is indeed just a local
field as other Yang-Mills fields. But the point is that in ur-theory it will nevertheless be possible
to have a global spherical model of the cosmos, since we got global curvature right from the
beginning by taking S3 as the cosmic model.
4 Tomorrow: Qubits, Holographic Principle and the Ontology
of Information
In this last section I shall come back to the more philosophical issues of ur-theory. In Sect. 2 we
already noticed that, ontologically speaking, information in ur-theory seems to gain the status
of a modern notion of substance. Two questions are simply unavoidable then: Does information
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exist without a carrier? Does information exist without an observer or information-gathering
system?
Again, the very idea of ur-theory is to characterize physical objects entirely by the informa-
tion which can be gained from them. The further, novel feature is that even space or spacetime
is reconstructed here as a mere device to represent information. By the time Weizsa¨cker pro-
posed it, this was a revolutionary new perspective. Nowadays, in modern quantum gravity, there
is a strikingly similar discussion about the deeper connections between space and information,
which has its roots in the considerations of black hole entropy. In the early days, black holes
were thought of as characterized by three quantities only: mass, angular momentum and charge
(“no hair”-property). But this in turn means that we could use them as ‘entropy graves’ by
simply feeding them with the products of high entropy processes. This caused Jakob Bekenstein
(1973) to attribute thermodynamical properties to black holes. In particluar, the surface of the
event horizon A in Planck units turns out as a suitable measure of the entropy content
S =
1
4
A, (4)
thus leading to a generalized second law of thermodynamics.
Formula (4) is in many respects quite remarkable. As Gerard ’t Hooft (cf. his 2001) has
pointed out, it does characterize physical objects on the most fundamental level not by the
three-dimensional volume they occupy in space, but by a ‘projection’ of their degrees of freedom
on a two-dimensional area much like a hologram. He thus calls this idea the holographic principle.
From an ur-theoretic point of view, it is rather the characterization of physical objects in terms
of pure information, which becomes evident here. Indeed, if we calculate the entropy and, hence,
information content of the whole universe in Planck lengths, we get Su ≈ (10
60)2 = 10120 bits.
In the same way we get Sn ≈
(
λ
lo
)2
= 1040 bits for a nucleon—hence, the ur-numbers Weizsa¨cker
already found in the 60’s! For an electron, however, (4) leads to Se ≈
(
λe
lo
)2
= 1046 in contrast
to the 1037 urs stated in Sect. 2.
Another calculation may suffice (cf. Go¨rnitz 1988). Suppose spherical symmetry A = 4piR2
and the Schwarzschild radius R = 2M , then (4) transforms to
S = 4piM2. (5)
Again, for the whole universe Mu = 10
60mo we get Su = 10
120 bits as above. The information
content of a particle with mass m then actually is the entropy difference of a universe with or
without such a particle, and hence
∆S = 4pi
(
(Mu +m)
2 −M2u
)
≈ 8piMum. (6)
We now get Sn ≈ 10
40 and Se ≈ 10
37 in accordance with the results from Sect. 2. It seems
therefore that ur-theory does not directly support the view of the holographic principle—and
perhaps this could be a helpful insight for other programs as well.
Indeed, the relevance of the Bekenstein entropy has been acknowledged and partially ex-
plained in modern quantum gravity programs—in string theory as well as in the quantum loop
approach (cf. Rovelli 1998b). Weizsa¨cker’s explanation—historically the first—is a further al-
ternative. The Ashtekar-inspired, canonical quantum loop approach has indeed some core sim-
ilarities with ur-theory. Like Penrose’s twistor approach, quantum loop gravity has its most
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suitable representation in terms of spin networks. It is certainly the most powerful among the
spinoristic programs today, whose key feature is that they are background-free. Of course, all
of the programs mentioned are mathematically by far more elaborated than ur-theory, which
merely is an outline or perhaps a raw framework of a spinoristic theory. The true advantage of
Weizsa¨cker’s approach is rather its philosophical underpinning—and this may also serve other
programs.3
To explore the implications of a true ontology of information in physics, consider equation
(5) again. It indeed highlights the ur-theoretic view that energy-matter is information. In
a future quantum gravity, formula (5) might obtain the same status as Einstein’s E = mc2,
which indicates the ontological equivalence of energy and matter. However, would this suffice
to consider information as a substance? Surely, the age-old distinction between matter and
form lurks behind this question. Aristotle considered a (physical) object a synholon that is a
composition of form (eidos) and matter (hyle). Form comes into matter, but none of these can
exist independently, as far as physical objects are concerned. For Aristotle the essence of a thing
is its form, the collection of all the attributes characterizing the object completely. In modern
terms: the total information which can be gained from it. Nevertheless Aristotle insisted in
the necessity of matter. He claimed the existence of a prote hyle, a “first matter” as a kind
of a neutral, universal substance. The prote hyle is nothing we can specify any further, any
form is stripped off from it. It does therefore not belong to the realm of physics, but can be
considered the hypokeimenon of form—that on which form is based. Such a concept is clearly a
pure metaphysical one and whether we like to make demands on it lies per definitionem beyond
physics. What can empirically be known about an object, is per se reducible to information and
in this sense physics indeed reduces to information. Perhaps, ur-theory is just the most rigorous
anccount to take this insight seriously.
So far, information has been treated in an absolute sense. However, from a conceptual point
of view the notion of information is inherently a context-related, relative concept presupposing
semantics (cf. Lyre 2002). As Weizsa¨cker has put it: information does only exist in relation to
the difference of two semantical levels. E.g. the sign H on a sheet of paper has its ‘meaning’
as the eighth letter of the Latin capital alphabet or the seventh of the Greek; but it may also
mean just a collection of ink molecules. To specify a particular amount of information, a certain
semantics must be presupposed, absolute numbers of information are ‘meaningless.’
From this point of view the above derived ur and, hence, bit numbers appear as highly
questionable. Under which “context” do they fall? How could one specify the semantics of
physical objects? Actually, the idea of (context-) “relatedness” in physics is not at all a new
one, relativity theory heavily relies on it. In ur-theory, the generators of the Poincare´ group (cf.
Castell 1975 and Weizsa¨cker 1985, p. 407) create and annihilate urs. Quite naturally, then, the
information content of a physical state becomes a frame-dependent statement. This even applies
to the information content of the universe. We may think of the 10120 bits of the world or its age
of 1060 Planck times in relation to observers in the rest-frame of the cosmos only. Proponents
of certain quantum gravity approaches, as for instance Carlo Rovelli (1997), advocate that
only an extreme relationalist view of space and time holds—as far as general covariance in
general relativity and its consequences in quantum gravity are concerned. Ur-theory partially
supports this view. On the other hand, there is no other system left outside the universe.
3For a recent dialogue between philosophy of science and quantum gravity research see Callender and Huggett
(2001).
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Thus, the information content of the universe has an ‘absolute’ meaning in an operational
sense. It is therefore not clear to me whether it makes sense to tackle cosmology in a rigorous
generally covariant manner, where there is no distinguished observer left. Operationally we are
distinguished as inner observers of the universe with respect to its rest-frame. In ur-theory the
cosmic model is therefore not derived as a solution of a certain set of basic equations, but as the
epitome of the existence of observers and physical objects in spacetime itself: the representation
of one ur. Global cosmic spacetime should perhaps be treated significantly different than local
considerations.
Heisenberg’s saying that there is no physics left, if we leave aside the possibility of any ob-
servers at all, does apply here, too. It was originally intended as a comment on the quantum
measurement problem, not on problems about global spacetime. Ur-theory combines both mean-
ings: urs are essentially quantum wavefunctions of the cosmos—“cosmic qubits” so to speak.
The relevance of the observer as a ‘device’ whose factual observation ‘creates’ the observed thing
is in ur-theory both supported from a rigorous quantum as well as information theoretic basis.
As we already indicated in Sect. 2, the ur as a qubit represents potential information. Measure-
ments must be understood as transitions from potential to actual information. The upshot is
that indeed the world only comes into being for measuring observers—not for them as particular
individuals, but for the idea and possibility of such observers in general. Kant would have called
this the transcendental subject. In my view it is the unavoidable epistemological consequence
of a fundamental physics of quantum information, and, eventually, the philosophy of physics
presumably has to deal with questions of this sort.
Our speculations have come to a certain end now. Perhaps I was able to support a bit the
view that ur-theory is an account which allows for challenging considerations on fundamental
questions of physics and the philosophy of physics, questions which are not even touched upon
within the mainstream. As a physical program, ur-theory surely suffers from mathematical
elaboration as compared to other programs and does therefore not even earn the name “theory”
in a strict sense. But it is still highly impressing that Weizsa¨cker had his main starting ideas
already at a time, when other programs were far from being born. The main ingredients of ur-
“theory”—information and spinorism—do exist as central motives in modern approaches as well
(as pointed out in the above). Perhaps the future development may lead to a mutual stimulation
between other programs and the ur-hypothesis—at any rate this is what I wish Carl Friedrich
von Weizsa¨cker from the heart.
References
Bekenstein, J. D. (1973). Black holes and entropy. Physical Review D, 7:2333–2346.
Callender, C. and Huggett, N., editors (2001). Physics meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Castell, L. (1975). Quantum Theory of Simple Alternatives. In Castell, Drieschner, and
Weizsa¨cker, editors, volume 1.
Castell, L., Drieschner, M. and Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v., editors (1975-1986). Quantum Theory
and the Structures of Time and Space (6 volumes). Hanser, Munich.
C. F. von Weizsa¨cker’s Reconstruction of Physics: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 10
Finkelstein, D. (1994). Finite Physics. In Herken, R., editor, The Universal Turing Machine
- A Half-Century Survey. Springer, Vienna.
Go¨rnitz, T. (1988). Abstract quantum theory and space-time-structure. I. Ur theory and
Bekenstein-Hawking entropy. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 27(5):527–
542.
Lyre, H. (1998a). Quantentheorie der Information. Springer, Vienna.
Lyre, H. (1998b). Quantum space-time and tetrads. International Journal of Theoretical
Physics, 37(1):393–400. (E-print quant-ph/9703028).
Lyre, H. (2000). A generalized equivalence principle. International Journal of Modern Physics
D, 9(6):633–647. (E-print gr-qc/0004054).
Lyre, H. (2002). Informationstheorie. Eine philosophisch-naturwissenschaftliche Einfu¨hrung.
Fink, Munich. (UTB 2289).
Rovelli, C. (1997). Halfway through the woods: Contemporary research on space and time.
In Earman, J. and Norton, J., editors, The Cosmos of Science. University of Pittsburgh
Press/Universita¨tsverlag Konstanz.
Rovelli, C. (1998). Strings, loops and the others: A critical survey on the present approaches
to quantum gravity. In Dadhich, N. and Narlikar, J., editors, Gravitation and Relativity:
At the Turn of the Millennium. Poona University Press, Poona. (E-print gr-qc/9803024).
’t Hooft, G. (2001). Obstacles on the way towards the quantisation of space, time and matter—
and possible resolutions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32:157–
180.
Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v. (1952). Eine Frage u¨ber die Rolle der quadratischen Metrik in der Physik.
Zeitschrift fu¨r Naturforschung, 7 a:141.
Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v. (1958). Die Quantentheorie der einfachen Alternative (Komplementarita¨t
und Logik II). Zeitschrift fu¨r Naturforschung, 13 a:245–253.
Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v., Scheibe, E., and Su¨ssmann, G. (1958). Komplementarita¨t und Logik, III.
Mehrfache Quantelung. Zeitschrift fu¨r Naturforschung, 13 a:705–721.
Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v. (1985). Aufbau der Physik. Hanser, Munich.
Weizsa¨cker, C. F. v. (1992). Zeit und Wissen. Hanser, Munich.
